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MagnetDroid is a novel artificial intelligence framework that inte-
grates a security ontology, a multi-agent organisation, and a logical
reasoning procedure to help build a bridge between the worlds
of Android application analysis and law, with respect to privacy.
Our contribution helps identify violations of the law by Android
applications, as well as predict legal consequences. The resulting
implementation of MagnetDroid can be useful to privacy-concerned
users in order to acknowledge problems with the privacy of the
applications they use, to application developers/publishers to help
them identify which problems to fix, and to lawyers in order to
provide an additional level of interpretation for any court when
considering the privacy of Android applications.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy; •Computingmethodologies→Multi-
agent systems; • Applied computing→ Law;
KEYWORDS
Android, Intelligent Agents, Law, Logic Programming, Ontologies,
Privacy, Security.
ACM Reference Format:
Emanuele Uliana and Kostas Stathis and Robert Jago. 2019. MagnetDroid:
security-oriented analysis for bridging privacy and law for Android appli-
cations. In Seventeenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and
Law (ICAIL ’19), June 17–21, 2019, Montreal, QC, Canada. ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3322640.3326729
1 INTRODUCTION
In our modern data-driven world, most, if not all the information
regarding a specific individual or group can be recorded through
data. Therefore, data must assume a central role when characteris-
ing the concept of privacy, not in an abstract philosophical sense,
but from a modern and pragmatic point of view. It is not far-fetched
to say that today privacy of individuals is asymptotic to the privacy
of their data. As data, by their own nature, are made to be stored,
processed, and exchanged, it is natural to identify security as a
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necessary condition for their privacy. In particular, no data can
be (remain) private if the storage system, the processing routines,
and the exchanging infrastructure(s) are not secure enough with
respect to the state-of-the-art of known attacks.
While this is true in general, we choose to focus our attention on
a specific subset of the global data environment, namely, mobile op-
erating systems (OSs), and, more specifically, Android applications.
Android, by far the most popular mobile OS[2], comes with its own
security model[4]. However, such security model, while lowering
some of the risks identifiable in a mobile OS threat model, leaves
significant security decisions in the hands of developers, users,
and third parties (e.g., servers applications exchange data with). In
practice, this contributes to the existence of an entire ecosystem of
• vulnerable applications which expose the data of their users
to higher risks;
• malicious applications whose only purpose is to trick their
users or perform activities behind their back, enhancing the
probability of misuse of private data.
Society has responded to the issue of vulnerable/malicious applica-
tions in the sameway it managed vulnerable andmalicious software
for non-mobile operating system. From the technological point
of view, vendors patch vulnerabilities, and third parties develop
analysis tools to be able to identify vulnerabilities, and malicious
behaviours.
From the legal point of view, countries have introduced rules and
regulations on data protection (e.g, in the UK the Data Protection
Act 2018 (which implements the GDPR[17]), and The Network and
Information Systems Regulations 2018) which aim to discourage
carelessness (of developers) and maliciousness (of attackers), and
to punish them, when applicable, in case of incidents.
The general problem with those approaches is that they hardly
inter-operate, and sometimes attempt to pursue conflicting goals,
such as in the long standing conflict between end-to-end encryption
and state-mandated backdoors in cryptographic primitives [21]. The
problem can be further exemplified by the fact that, usually, Android
application analysis tools do not care about (factor in) the law. One
reason is that the security of an application does not depend on
the law. Another reason lies in the fact that the developers of those
tools, usually, are not that knowledgeable about the legal position.
Also, the law can often reference vague technological concepts
(e.g., confidentiality) without defining them, leaving the door open
to (sometimes conflicting) interpretations by different courts. This
uncertainty, which is already a potential problem for the developers
of Android applications, does not make the legal issues attractive
for developers of analysis tools either.
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The goal of our work is to contribute towards bridging the gap
between technology and law by providing a technology-guided
interpretation of a subset of the Data Protection Act 2018 and The
Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 in the context
of Android applications. The contribution of our work is that we
identify necessary conditions for the gap to be bridged, i.e., unity
on the technological side, and a model for the law. In particular,
we propose an Android Security Ontology (ASO), and a procedure
to aggregate heterogeneous reports from different Android appli-
cation analysis tools under a common syntax/semantics which
enables logical reasoning. We also propose a multi-agent platform
to preform the aforementioned procedure. We propose a model of
a subset of the Data Protection Act 2018 and The Network and Infor-
mation Systems Regulations 2018 which enables logical reasoning as
well. We explore logical reasoning techniques in order to develop a
knowledge-based procedure which, given the previous results, is
able to detect incompatibilities of Android applications with what
the law prescribes in terms of security, and attempts to foresee the
legal consequences of violations and incidents.
In Section 2 we discuss the background surrounding our work,
as well as the state-of-the-art and its limitations. In Section 3.1 we
describe the Android Security Ontology. In Section 3.2 we describe
the flow to generate a technological knowledge base from an Android
application and a set of application analysis tools. In Section 4 we
describe our model (i.e., legal knowledge base) of the Data Protection
Act 2018 and The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018.
In Section 4.2 we describe how to use the technological knowledge
base and the legal knowledge base to derive incompatibilities and
predict legal consequences. In Section 5 we show an example of our
work in a practical scenario. In Section 6 we explain the limitations
of our work, together with planned directions for future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND EXISTINGWORK
Bridging the worlds of technology and law in the context of Android
requires an understanding of how each view manages the problems
of vulnerable and malicious applications. Ideally, we would like to
gather the results on the technological side, and use an aggrega-
tion of them as a technological knowledge base. Security researchers
have ported the same strategies that proved successful with non-
mobile software. In particular, they have extended the two main
approaches (static and dynamic analysis) to work with mobile ap-
plications. The static approach leverages (source or machine) code
analysis of a software program to discover behavioural patterns,
while the dynamic approach executes the program in a (real or
emulated) monitored environment in order to trigger and record
notable behaviours.
Related works on Android application analysis. Among the rele-
vant work on application analysis of Android applications, we can
cite Babelview[31], Androguard[14], MalloDroid[18], FlowDroid[6],
Apposcopy[19], and Dexpler[7] as examples of static analysis. On
the other hand, DroidScope[45], CopperDroid[38], PuppetDroid[20],
TaintDroid[16], DroidTrace[47], Andlantis[10], and IntelliDroid[44]
mainly employ dynamic analysis. There have been attempts to
bridge the two families of approaches, such as SMV-HUNTER[35],
Andrubis[25], and Andrototal[26]. Static and dynamic analysis have
their own pros and cons[15], and some of them are peculiar and
unique to mobile OSs.[15] However, the number of unique Android
applications is raising at a fast pace[2], and a certain degree of
automation is needed in order to be able to analyse the raw amount
of applications in a reasonable time. Here we encounter the first
problem: usually the analysis tools are standalone, and their re-
ports have arbitrary syntax and semantics. In other words, there
is no underlying common ontology. The reports are mainly meant
for humans to read, as natural language is mainly featured. For
this reason, they are not easily understood by automated software
programs. It is hard and demanding to automatically aggregate
different reports from different tools, in order to merge the infor-
mation they provide. This is a problem for us, because, if we want
a technological knowledge base comprising a significant variety
of security issues, we have to aggregate reports deriving from the
analysis of a certain application with different tools. Aggregation
of heterogeneous sources of information has been attempted in the
past by means of leveraging agent platforms, as discussed by Ishii
et al [22]. As our problem is very specific, we cannot reuse existing
agent frameworks. However, we agree that a multi-agent platform
is a suitable component for our needs.
Related works on ontologies for Android. On the subject of specify-
ing ontologies in the context of Android, we can cite: Android goes
Semantic: DL Reasoners on Smartphones[46], A Power Consump-
tion Benchmark Framework for Ontology Reasoning on Android
Devices[40], A linguistic mobile decision support system based on
fuzzy ontology to facilitate knowledge mobilization[28], A user
profile ontology based approach for assisting people with dementia
in mobile environments[34], A smart indoor navigation solution
based on building information model and google android[33], An-
droid Based Effective and Efficient Search Engine Retrieval System
Using Ontology[24], and Privacy protection for smartphones: an
ontology-based firewall[41]. Unfortunately, none of those captures
the relevant security concepts we expect to find inside the reports
generated by application analysis tools. In light of this, one of our
contributions is to create a custom Android Security Ontology (ASO)
which then can be used as a guide to aggregate heterogeneous
reports.
Related legal background. In legal terms, the provisions regard-
ing data protection (e.g., the Data Protection Act 2018 [1], and The
Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 [3]) are relevant
to our needs. We can identify a twofold approach to data protection.
On one side, we have law with a prescriptive function (LPF, or pre-
scriptive law from now on) which mainly enumerates obligations
for parties (e.g., developers) with respect to some properties (e.g.,
data confidentiality, data integrity, data authenticity) which are left
open to interpretation. On the other side, we have law with a con-
sequence function (LCF, or consequential law from now on) which
details the triggered consequences should certain events (e.g., data
leaks) happen. It is important to note that the consequences only
apply after the incident has happened, not if there is the potential
(i.e., all the conditions are met) for the incident to happen. As the
law is written in natural language, it is even harder to understand
for an automated system. Moreover, since the law is always sub-
ject to a certain degree of interpretation by lawyers during court
cases, its formulation is not at all automation-friendly. We need to
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model the relevant rules and regulations in order to create a legal
knowledge base suitable for our purposes.
3 MAGNETDROID FRAMEWORK
In order to address the issues identified in Section 2, we discuss:
• an Android Security Ontology to specify a common syntax/se-
mantics for analysis tools reports;
• a general architecture for retrieving, translating, and aggre-
gating reports in the form of a multi-agent platform;
• a model of a subset of the Data Protection Act 2018 and The
Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018;
• a reasoning procedure to use the results of the previous
points to discover incompatibilities between the analysed ap-
plication(s) and the LPF, as well as predict legal consequences
derived from the LCF.
3.1 Android Security Ontology (ASO)
As anticipated in Section 2, we would like to re-use existing Android
application analysis tools in order to produce reports of security
problems. However, running analysis tools on a specific application
usually results in a collection of heterogeneous documents which
are hard to automatically post-process. For this reason, our ASO1
guides the translation and aggregation procedure which produces
a final report wrapping a so called technological knowledge base.
Our ASO is a tree-like structure where each node is a concept
related to the security of Android applications, and each parent-
children relation is either a partition of the parent into its compo-
nents (e.g., permissions into protection_normal, protection_signature,
dangerous, spacial), or a link from a more general concept (e.g., net-
work_activity) to a more specific one (e.g., observed_protocols). The
root is android_application, and its immediate children are assets,
risks, threats, vulnerabilities, behaviours, and features. The leaves
consist of fine-grained concepts that we expect to find in reports
such as broken_tls, meaning the use of insecure parameters with the
network communication protocol TLS [5]. The structure of internal
and leaf nodes is shown in Figure 1.
Each leaf may contain one or more state variables. Each state vari-
able is a container for structured information on a very specific
aspect of the security of Android applications, plus some custom
indexes and classes which help characterising the severity of the
problem (if any), and its impact under two different mindsets:
• credulous: an optimistic view such that problems are not
really considered unless they have an immediate and cata-
strophic effect on the entire user-app-provider environment.
• skeptical: a pessimistic view that treats every discovered
problem/vulnerability as if it intrinsically had an immediate
and catastrophic effect on such environment.
The motivation for the multiple mindsets lies in one of the practical
uses for ASO, namely the creation of a technological knowledge
base (described in Section 3.2) which enables logical reasoning
(described in Section 4) together with a legal knowledge base (also
described in Section 4). In particular, it transcends the bounds of
technology, as it is rooted in the concept of interpretation of the
1For a detailed demo see https://dicelab.co.uk/aso.html.
Figure 1: A diagram illustrating the internal structure of nodes,
leaf nodes, and state variables.
law. Depending on the interpretation, problems may be considered
relevant:
• only if even the most optimistic (i.e., credulous) view recog-
nises them as important;
• as soon as the most pessimistic (i.e., skeptical) view recog-
nises them as important.
Therefore, we capture this twofold interpretation by separating our
mindset into two. In order to measure each mindset numerically,
we make use of two pairs of index-class. In particular, the credulous
approach is represented by the minimal impact index, and the
minimal impact class, while the skeptical approach is represented
by the maximal impact index, and the maximal impact class. The
meaning of those indexes, and their usage is detailed in Section 3.2,
and Section 4.
The absolute relevance index, and the absolute relevance class,
on the other hand, represent how much weight (i.e., consider im-
portant/relevant) a state variable carries in absolute terms. The
absolute index and class are an intrinsic property of the state vari-
able, and, as such do not change depending on the current_state
value of the variable. The structure of state variables is depicted in
Figure 1.
The importance of the structure of ASO is that it offers us a
guide for translating tool reports whose format is often arbitrary. In
this way, we can use ASO as a common and systematic format for
reports, which is currently lacking. We will see later in Section 3.2,
that the translation of a report consists of an instantiation of ASO,
by means of selecting a meaningful value for every field (except the
static ones e.g. id, name, possible_states, and the absolute indexes
and classes) of each state variable. In addition, the value to assign
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to each field of a particular state variable is selected in accordance
with the content(s) of the report to translate.
It is possible that the report does not cover the subject a state
variable refers to. In this case, ASO provides the reserved value
UNASSIGNED as a backup strategy. Also, ASO supports an addi-
tional reserved value named CONFLICTING. We will see later in
Section 3.2 that this value is mainly useful during the aggregation
of translated documents, in case an unsolvable conflict is found. Its
internal structure has been crafted so to keep track of the disagree-
ment in case a solution is found in the future (e.g., by means of a
manual validation). The aforementioned internal structure, as well
as the trivial structure of UNASSIGNED are shown in Figure 1.
3.2 MagnetDroid: creating the technological
knowledge base
The ASO can be used as a guide to translate and aggregate reports
from Android application analysis tools. We present a multi-agent
framework to produce and collect raw reports from available anal-
ysis tools, perform the translation and aggregate the translated
reports to produce a so called final report to wrap our technological
knowledge base. Our agent architecture, inspired by GOLEM [11]
consists of an environment containing a pre-specified set of agents,
each assigned with a specific role to play in the system (see Sec-
tion 3.2.1). Our agents are characterised by a body that wraps a
set of sensors for the agent to perceive the environment, a set of
actuators for the agent to change the environment, and a mind
for the agent to decide which action(s) to execute next. The mind
is characterised by reasoning procedures (as in the architecture
proposed by the KGP model of agency [23]), so that it is able think
which action is best to perform, when confronted with multiple
alternatives. In this context, the agent mind is in a perpetual cycle
whose steps are
(1) perceive(), which fetches any new perception available
from the sensors;
(2) revise(), which revises the internal state and beliefs of the
mind, when new sensing information is received;
(3) decide(), which determines the next action to execute in
the environment;
(4) execute(), which triggers the execution by propagating to
the body the action decided.
Each agents has its own implementation of the four steps, and it
own pool of available actions (see Section 3.2.1). In the current
version of MagnetDroid, the decision process follows the teleo-
reactive programming paradigm [29, 32], which allows the agent to
exhibit behaviours defined as a set of condition-action rules, each
set being indexed by the implicit goal that the behaviour achieves.
Such behaviours have the form:
G : {C1 → A1;C2 → A2; · · · ;Cn → An }
where G is the goal that the behaviour achieves, Ci with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
being the conditions of the rules, whileAi are the actions that need
to executed. At each cycle step, one of these rules succeeds, only if
the conditions are satisfied in the internal state of the agent, and
then the action is executed. The listing below shows the cycle of a
WorkerAgent (discussed in Section 3.2.1) and illustrates how the
top-level decide() is formulated as a teleo-reactive behaviour:
public void p e r c e i v e ( ) {
f e t c h P e r c e p t s ( ) . s t ream ( ) . f o rEach ( th i s : : s t o r e P e r c e p t s ) ;
}
public void r e v i s e ( ) {
i f ( ! th i s . i s A n a l y s i s S t a r t e d ) {
th i s . i s A n a l y s i s S t a r t e d = c h e c k F o rAn a l y s i s S t a r t e d ( ) ;
}
i f ( th i s . i s A n a l y s i s S t a r t e d && ! th i s . i s A n a l y s i s F i n i s h e d ) {
th i s . i s A n a l y s i s F i n i s h e d = ch e c k F o rAna l y s i s F i n i s h e d ( ) ;
}
e l se i f ( th i s . i s A n a l y s i s F i n i s h e d && ! th i s . i sR epo r tReady ) {
th i s . r epo r tReady = checkForRepor tReady ( ) ;
}
}
public MagnetDroidAct ion d e c i d e ( ) {
i f ( th i s . i sR epo r tReady ) {
return new SendRepor tToCoord ina to rAc t i on ( th i s . r e p o r t ) ;
}
e l se i f ( th i s . i s A n a l y s i s F i n i s h e d ) {
return new Re t r i e v eR epo r tA c t i o n ( ) ;
}
e l se i f ( ! th i s . i s A n a l y s i s S t a r t e d ) {
return new S t a r t An a l y s i sA c t i o n ( th i s . apk ) ;
}
e l se {
return manageToolExecut ion ( ) ;
}
}
public void exe cu t e ( MagnetDroidAct ion a c t i o n ) {
sendToBody ( a c t i o n ) ;
}
3.2.1 The flow of the phases. In order to use our multi-agent frame-
work to translate and aggregate reports from Android application
analysis tools, we designed a flow consisting of 3 distinct phases:
(1) Phase 1: parallel analysis.
(2) Phase 2: translation.
(3) Phase 3: aggregation.
Figure 2 depicts a schematic visualisation of the phases.
Figure 2: A diagram of the phases from the APK and the tools to
the final report.
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Collecting the reports. In Phase 1: parallel analysis, we have a
CoordinatorAgent which is given an APK (essentially a zip file
containing the Android application), and the knowledge of the set
of available analysis tools. The CoordinatorAgent dispatches a
set of WorkerAgents, one for each available tool, in order to run
each tool on the APK, provide the necessary inputs (if applicable),
and retrieve the generated report.
Parsing the raw reports. Phase 2: translation is divided in two
sub-phases: parsing and ASO instantiation. During the first half, a
highly specialised ParsingAgent receives a report from the Coor-
dinatorAgent. Immediately, it attempts to classify it as either a
narrative or factual report. Narrative refers to the fact that time is
featured and important in the report. In particular, the report itself
is characterised by a series of events with either explicit, or implicit
(i.e., the ordering) timestamps. Factual, on the other side, means
that time is not featured and that it is irrelevant, as the report is
essentially a collection of facts about the analysed application. More
often than not, the class of a report depends exclusively on the tool
used to produce it. Therefore, the ParsingAgent guesses the class
based on the name of the tool. Then, the ParsingAgent polishes
the report by removing unnecessary information that is useless
for the translation (e.g., welcome messages and unreasonably ver-
bose debug messages). This step varies in complexity depending
on the nature of the report (narrative vs. factual), and ultimately,
on the tool which produces the report in the first place. Section 5
shows an example of what a narrative and a factual report look
like. The ParsingAgent abstracts from narrative reports an or-
dered sequence of event occurrences, which we represent here in a
logic-based format of Prolog (where capitalised names of arguments
denote variables and names starting with lower case letters denote
constants):
happens_a t ( Timestamp_1 , Even t 1 _ i n f o ) .
. . .
happens_a t ( Timestamp_N , EventN_ in fo ) .
where Timestampi orders the occurrence of the description con-
tained in an Eventi_in f o, which in turn contains information about
the content of a report (and 1 ≤ i ≤ N ). Likewise, the ParsingA-
gent abstracts from factual reports a non-ordered collection of
facts represented as
ho l d s _ i n ( Repor t Id , F a c t 1 _ i n f o ) .
. . .
h o l d s _ i n ( Repor t Id , F a c tN_ in f o ) .
where ReportId is the identifier of the report and Facti_in f o is
a piece of relevant information about the application and/or its
behaviour during the analysis phase.
Instantiating the ASO. When the ParsingAgent has completed
its task, it passes the polished report to a highly-specialised Trans-
latingAgent which is responsible for the second half on the trans-
lation, namely instantiating ASO. The TranslatingAgent has a
perfect knowledge of ASO, and is able to interpret the contents of a
polished report produced by a specific ParsingAgent. The Trans-
latingAgent iterates through every leaf of ASO, and, for every
leaf, for every state variable, checks within the polished report for
useful information in order to assign a value to the relevant fields
of the state variable. In case such information does not exist within
the polished report, the special value UNASSIGNED is assigned
instead.
Aggregating the reports. After all the reports have been trans-
lated, the TranslatingAgents report back to the Coordinator-
Agent, which now dispatches an AggregatingAgent with the
task to aggregate the translated reports, initiating Phase 3: aggre-
gation. Since the translated reports are nothing else than instan-
tiations of ASO, they share common syntax and semantics, and,
therefore, it is much easier to define an automated procedure to
aggregate the information contained in each of them. The aggrega-
tion procedure loops through the branches of ASO, and, for every
translated report, fetches the state variables, and tries to merge
them. During such process, a conflict arises when, for a specific
field of a specific state variable, different translated reports disagree
on the value, or one of the values is, CONFLICTING itself. If there
is no reasonable way to derive an agreed value from the conflicting
values, we have an unsolvable conflict. Otherwise, if a value com-
patible with all the disagreeing values can be derived, that becomes
the agreed value, and the conflict vanishes.
The result of the aggregation is the final report, which contains
our technological knowledge base. In practice, it is an instantiation
of ASO containing all the relevant information from the original
raw reports combined.
3.2.2 The technological knowledge base. From the final report we
are able to explicitly render the technological knowledge base by
means of translating state variables into statements expressed in the
logic-based language Prolog. In particular, statements are generated
to keep track of the parent-child relations, and to bind state variables
to leaves.
In case the actual value of a state variable is UNASSIGNED, the
variable is not translated to Prolog. If, however, reports provide
conflicting values for the same state variable, the label CONFLICT-
ING is used for the value, and the variable is included in the final
report purely to avoid data loss, since further analysis in the future
may lead to a solution of the conflict.
On top of assertions representing instances of state variables in
the ASO tree-hierarchy, the technological knowledge base comprises
rules which link state variables to the high-level properties of data
confidentiality, data integrity, and data authenticity. These rules
represent what we call violations. The following listing shows a
practical example of a violation rule which, in case of success,
indicates that the application uniquely identified by App uses an
insecure protocol with notable implications [27] on the privacy of
the transmitted data:
v i o l a t e d ( d a t a _ c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ( App , Repor t ) , s k e p t i c a l , r u l e 1 ) :−
a s o_ r oo t ( Report , RootID , _ , _ , _ ) ,
c h i l d _ o f ( Report , MetadataID , RootID ) ,
a n c e s t o r _ o f ( Report , MetadataID , RootID ) ,
s t a t e _ v a r ( Report , AppHashID , MetadataID , appHash , App , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ ) ,
a n c e s t o r _ o f ( Report , T ls ID , RootID ) ,
s t a t e _ v a r ( Report , SSLID , TLSID , " s s l 3 . 0 " , observed , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ , Mxii , _ ) ,
Mxi i > 5 .
v i o l a t e d ( d a t a _ c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ( App , Repor t ) , c r edu lous , r u l e 2 ) :−
a s o_ r oo t ( Report , RootID , _ , _ , _ ) ,
c h i l d _ o f ( Report , MetadataID , RootID ) ,
a n c e s t o r _ o f ( Report , MetadataID , RootID ) ,
s t a t e _ v a r ( Report , AppHashID , MetadataID , appHash , App , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ ) ,
a n c e s t o r _ o f ( Report , T ls ID , RootID ) ,
s t a t e _ v a r ( Report , SSLID , TLSID , " s s l 3 . 0 " , observed , _ , _ , _ , Mi i i , _ , _ , _ ) ,
M i i i > 9 .
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purpose_o f ( ru l e 1 , " I n s e c u r e ␣ SSL3 . 0 ␣ d e t e c t e d ␣ under ␣ the ␣ s k e p t i c a l ␣ approach " ) .
pu rpose_o f ( ru l e 2 , " I n s e c u r e ␣ SSL3 . 0 ␣ d e t e c t e d ␣ under ␣ the ␣ c r e du l ou s ␣ approach " ) .
Each of the two violation rules above detect the use of an insecure
protocol by exploring the ASO tree from the root to the leaf node
related to TLS, and then looking at the value of the state variable
related to SSL3.0. If such value is observed, SSL3.0 has been observed
at least once by at least one tool during Phase 1: parallel analysis.
The two rules differ by means of the approach they take to inter-
pret the final report. In particular, the first rule adopts the skeptical
mindset, where even with an average (i.e. 5) maximal impact in-
dex (Mxii) the violation is triggered. The second rule, on the other
hand, adopts the credulous mindset where, unless there is a high
value (i.e. 10) for the minimal impact index (Miii) the violation is
not triggered. The labels skeptical and credulous are used in the
parameters of the rules, as well as rule labels rule1 and rule2 to
uniquely identify such rules. The rule labels are then associated
with their purpose, in this case the detection of an insecure pro-
tocol under the different mindsets, which can be used as a form
of shallow explanation if a violation is detected. The underscore
denotes an anonymous variable, meaning that we are not interested
in the names of the arguments/parameters in these positions.
We are now in a position to describe if a property of an applica-
tion related to privacy is satisfied, such as data confidentiality, if all
violations in the knowledge base finitely fail.
s a t i s f i e d ( Proper ty , MindSet ) :− \+ v i o l a t e d ( Proper ty , MindSet , _ ) .
‘\+’ in the rule above is Prolog’s negation, known as negation-
as-failure [12]. We can now use the above rule to check that an
application is compliant to a number of properties as follows:
comp l i an t ( P r o p e r t i e s , MindSet ) :−
f o r a l l ( member ( Proper ty , P r o p e r t i e s ) , s a t i s f i e d ( Proper ty , MindSet ) ) .
The f orall/2 Prolog predicatewill ensure that eachmember Property
in the list of Properties that we need to check is satisfied in the
specificMindSet . For example, to check for the privacy properties
of an application called ’a1’ say, under the skeptical mindset, we
specify the query:
?− comp l i an t ( [
d a t a _ c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ( a1 ) ,
d a t a _ i n t e g r i t y ( a1 ) ,
d a t a _ a u t h e n t i c i t y ( a1 )
] , s k e p t i c a l ) .
The query will use the rules above (and check all the remaining
skeptical rules that describe the logical representation of the tech-
nological knowledge base) to identify whether these properties are
satisfied, and report it to the user.
4 USING MAGNETDROID WITH THE LAW
After modelling the technological side, in order to use our techno-
logical knowledge base to construct a bridge between technology
and law, we need to build a similar model of the law itself. Across
the world, laws are written in natural language, which entails no-
table problems for any perspective reasoning. In particular, the
same sequence of letters (i.e., word) may be used with different
meanings (i.e., ambiguity). It is also possible that some concepts
are mentioned, but not adequately defined or referenced. Moreover,
contradictions between different legislative instruments are a limit-
ing possibility. For these reasons, usually lawyers apply a process of
interpretation which can lead to inconsistent results starting from
the same premises (i.e., same facts, same rules, different lawyers,
different outcomes). As a specification in natural language is a bar-
rier, an abstraction can simplify the problem. Section 4.1 explains
our process of abstraction of a model.
4.1 Modelling the law
For simplicity, we only focus on a subset of the Data Protection
Act 2018 and The Network and Information Systems Regulations
2018. We are interested in ss66(1) and (2) of chapter 4 of the for-
mer, and s1(3)(g) of the latter. Our model first clusters legal the
rules into 2 different classes: law with prescriptive function, and
law with consequential function. The former comprises those legal
provisions that specify obligations for parties. The latter comprises
those legal provisions that specify consequences for parties, given
some other conditions. We create a tree-like structure, similar to
ASO with law as the root, and prescriptive and consequential as its
immediate children. The parent-children relations have the same
range of meanings of those in ASO. The children of prescriptive and
consequential are the leaves of the tree.
Prescriptive. Each child of prescriptive represents a specific “pre-
scription” which we identified as relevant for and compatible with
the context of privacy and security of Android applications. In
particular, it is characterised by a set of Prolog rules whose right
sides specify conditions for the truth of the left sides which, in
turn, specify obligations.2 We manually created those rules from
the aforementioned articles. For example, we track that a vendor of
an application is obliged to secure it for proper use.
Consequential. On the other hand, each child of consequential
tracks the potential consequences of events (e.g., incidents such as
data leaks) that we identified as relevant for and compatible with the
context of privacy and security of Android applications. Much like
each consequential leaf, it is characterised by a set of Prolog rules
whose right sides specify conditions, i.e., what must hold for the left
sides to become true, while the left sides specify the consequences.
It is important to note that, in practice, the consequences only
apply after one or more events have taken place, not if there is
the possibility of them happening. However, for our purposes of
predicting consequences, we treat the conditions as if they are
bound to hold at some point in the future, therefore allowing us to
present the users of our system with a warning type of result in
the form of potential consequences.
4.2 The legal knowledge base and post-analysis
Our legal knowledge base consists of a set of Prolog rules derived
from our model of the law, both prescriptive and consequential.
In the prescriptive case we represent obligations that need to be
fulfilled and linked to our technological knowledge base for concepts
that are potentially abstract in the law. This means that we will
need to introduce technological concepts, for example the notion
of mindset, as we have seen in Section 3.2.
In order to exemplify the legal knowledge base, consider the
situation where we need to express that a vendor of an application
2A schematic representation of the model of both the prescriptive and consequential
branches is available at https://dicelab.co.uk/law.html.
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is obliged to secure it for proper use [1]. We represent this in our
framework as:
f u l f i l s ( o b l i g e d ( Vendor , s e cu r e ( App ) ) , MindSet ) :−
comp l i an t ( [
d a t a _ c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ( App ) ,
d a t a _ i n t e g r i t y ( App ) ,
d a t a _ a u t h e n t i c i t y ( App )
] , MindSet ) .
As mentioned before, we have parameterised the fulfilment of the
obligation with the mindset of the compliance checking. The rule
is an example of how to link a legal model regarding security to the
technological aspects of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity.
As those concepts are not conclusively defined in the law, in order to
perform reasoning, we need to include the technological knowledge
base, so to provide a more comprehensive knowledge base. This is
an instance of MagnetDroid acting as a bridge between technology
and the law.
In the consequential case, on the other hand, we have condition
and consequences, whose relation is captured by Prolog rules. For
example, to express that a fine is issued if a data leak is observed,
we use the following rule:
i s s u e ( f i n e ( App ) , MindSet ) :− l e a k ( App , MindSet ) .
Note that the concept of leak is not explained, nor referenced in
the subset of the law we consider. Therefore, once again, we need
to refer to the technological knowledge base in order to find a proper
definition.
Once we have the union of both knowledge bases, we are able
to perform reasoning. In general, we are interested in two classes
of findings. First, we want to find obligations that are not fulfilled
(vs. the prescriptive law). Second, we want to predict consequences,
given specific conditions (i.e., consequential law).
Recalling the fulfils(...) rule from the legal knowledge base
- prescriptive, we are now able to perform reasoning, as the techno-
logical knowledge base contains rules (see Section 3.2) that allow
us to calculate the truth value of data_confidentiality(...),
data_integrity(...) and data_authenticity(...). If we find
that the truth value for all of the previous is true, then the body
(right side) of the fulfils(...) rule evaluates to true. Conse-
quently, the left side evaluates to true as well, indicating that App
fulfils the obligation. Alternatively, if the body of the fulfils(...)
rule evaluates to false, then App does not fulfil the obligation.
Recalling the issue(...) rule from the legal knowledge base -
consequential, we are now able to perform reasoning, as the tech-
nological knowledge base contains rules that allow us to calculate
the truth value of leak(...). In particular, one of such rules is
represented in the listing below:
l e a k ( App , MindSet ) :−
v i o l a t e d ( d a t a _ a u t h e n t i c i t y ( App , Repor t ) , MindSet , _ )
If violated(...) evaluates to true, then leak(...) is true as
well, which, in turn, causes issue(...) to evaluate to true. In this
case, we say that there are the conditions for the issuance of a fine.
Alternatively, if violated(...) evaluates to false, the propagation
of the truth value causes issue(...) to evaluate to false, meaning
that the conditions for the issuance of the fine are not met.
5 CASE STUDY
In order to study the applicability of our proposals, we perform
preliminary tests of the flow of the phases (see Section 3.2) on
two different APKs. The first is a calculator3, while the second is
a custom-build application which performs some dangerous be-
haviours, such as sending data via an HTTP POST in plaintext
(i.e., unencrypted and to an unauthenticated endpoint). We use
Bettercap, AndroTotal, and MalloDroid as the available tools. Bet-
tercap, among its functionalities, allows us to intercept the net-
work traffic between two endpoints. AndroTotal provides us with
(mainly) signature-based results regarding the maliciousness of
an application, according to a pool of anti-malware. MalloDroid
searches for misconfigurations within the code of the application
with respect to the usage of HTTPS. The following listing shows a
snippet of the raw report from Bettercap, edited in order to contain
only the meaningful information for the translation. The narra-
tive nature of the report is implied by the timestamp of the event
net.sniff.leak.http.
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 1 7 / 2 4 > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 3 >> [ 1 4 : 1 0 : 2 1 ] [ ne t . s n i f f . l e a k . h t t p ]
h t t p l o c a l POST example . com Moz i l l a / 5 . 0 ( X11 ; Android arm ; rv : 6 3 . 0 )




Host : example . com
User−Agent : Mo z i l l a / 5 . 0 ( X11 ; Android arm ; rv : 6 3 . 0 )
Gecko / 20100101 F i r e f o x / 6 3 . 0
Form :
mgtxt => Thi s message w i l l be i n t e r c e p t e d .
sendbtn => Send
nmtxt => U . N . Owen
a c t i o n => send
while Figure 3 offers a visualisation of a subset of the translated
report (i.e., a subset of the instantiated ASO).
Figure 2 depicts a schematic visualisation of the phases.
Figure 4 shows a visualisation of a subset of the raw report from
AndroTotal (in the form of a screenshot of a web page for presenta-
tion reasons), while Figure 5 represents a visualisation of a subset
of its translated form.
After the aggregation, the relevant subsection of the technological
knowledge base we derive from the the final report is the following:
% s t a t i c p a r t o f t h e knowledge ba s e .
r oo t ( Report , root ID , andro id_app , nu l l , Ch i l d r en IDs ) :−
node ( Report , root ID , andro id_app , nu l l , Ch i l d r en IDs ) .
c h i l d ( Report , NodeID , Pa ren t ID ) :−
node ( Report , NodeID , _ , Parent ID , _ ) .
c h i l d ( Report , NodeID , Pa ren t ID ) :−
l e a f ( Report , NodeID , _ , Parent ID , _ ) .
a n c e s t o r _ o f ( Report , NodeID , Ances tor ID ) :−
c h i l d ( Report , NodeID , Ances tor ID ) .
a n c e s t o r _ o f ( Report , NodeID , Ances tor ID ) :−
node ( Report , NodeID , _ , Parent ID , _ ) ,
a n c e s t o r _ o f ( Report , Parent ID , Ances tor ID ) .
v i o l a t e d ( d a t a _ c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ( App , Repor t ) , s k e p t i c a l , r u l e 1 ) :−
r oo t ( Report , RootID , _ , _ , _ ) ,
c h i l d ( Report , MetID , RootID ) ,
c h i l d ( Report , BehID , RootID ) ,
c h i l d ( Report , NetworkID , BehID ) ,
c h i l d ( Report , Prot ID , NetID ) ,
c h i l d ( Report , HttpID , Pro t ID ) ,
c h i l d ( Report , Post ID , HttpID ) ,
s t a t e _ v a r ( Report , AppHashID , MetID , app_hash , App , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ , _ ) ,
s t a t e _ v a r ( Report , V i s i t e d ID , Post ID , v i s i t e d _ s e r v e r s ,
_ , H i s to ry , _ , _ , _ , _ , Maii , _ ) ,
Mai i > 5 ,
\+ H i s t o ry == [ ] .
3package name: com.android2.calculator3
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Figure 3:A subset of the translated report generated from the origi-
nal report fromBettercap. Redundant or uninteresting information
is either omitted or replaced by omissis.
Figure 4: A visualisation of the report from AndroTotal
% from th e f i n a l r e p o r t
node ( r epor t ID , root ID , andro id_app , nu l l , [ behID , f e a t ID , metID , . . . ] ) .
node ( r epor t ID , behID , behav iour s , root ID , [ netID , . . . ] ) .
node ( r epor t ID , netID , n e two rk_ a c t i v i t y , behID , [ prot ID , . . . ] ) .
node ( r epor t ID , prot ID , p r o t o c o l s , netID , [ ht tp ID , . . . ] ) .
node ( r epor t ID , ht tp ID , " PLAIN_HTTP " , prot ID , [ hpost ID , . . . ] ) .
l e a f ( r epor t ID , hpost ID , " PLAIN_HTTP_POST " , h t tp ID , [ v i s i t e d ID , . . . ] ) .
node ( r epor t ID , f e a t ID , f e a t u r e s , root ID , [ mal ic ID , . . . ] ) .
l e a f ( r epor t ID , mal ic ID , known_mal ic iousness , f e a t ID , [ response ID , . . . ] ) .
l e a f ( r epor t ID , metID , metadata , root ID , [ appHashID , . . . ] ) .
s t a t e _ v a r ( r epor t ID , appHashID , metID , app_hash , a c tua l _ha sh ,
[ a c t u a l _ h a sh ] , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l ) .
s t a t e _ v a r ( r epor t ID , v i s i t e d ID , hpost ID , v i s i t e d _ s e r v e r s , " example . com " ,
Figure 5: A subset of the translated report generated from the orig-
inal report from AndroTotal. Redundant or uninteresting informa-
tion is either omitted or replaced by omissis.
[ " example . com " ] , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l , 5 , average , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l ) .
s t a t e _ v a r ( r epor t ID , response ID , mal ic ID , a nd r o t o t a l _ r e s p on s e , benign ,
[ ben ign ] , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l , 1 0 , c r i t i c a l ) .
from which, through reasoning, we are able to derive that our test
app violates the property of data confidentiality. Plugging this result
into the legal knowledge base, and performing additional reasoning
shows that our test application does not fulfil one of the obligations
(the very same data confidentiality).
Interpreting the results. Using the technological knowledge base
we derived that the property of data confidentiality does not hold
for our test application. We have used the technological knowledge
base to determine the truth value of one of the concepts introduced,
but not explained by the law. Then, we propagated this finding to the
legal knowledge base, and we found that, because of that, our test
application does not comply with one of the relevant obligations.
We have, in other words, found an incompatibility between what
the law prescribes, and one of the behaviours of our test application.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In our work, we have identified a gap between security-based
technology-powered privacy consideration for Android applica-
tions and the relevant law. We have built a bridge between these
two worlds that analyses these considerations using logical reason-
ing. Our approach has proposed an Android Security Ontology, a
multi-agent platform that translates and aggregates reports from
existing Android application analysis tools, and an aggregating
procedure that allows us to create what we call a technological
knowledge base. We can then use this knowledge base and link it to
the relevant legal provision. This allowed us to draw conclusions
about the privacy implications of an Android application under a
specific interpretation.
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We exemplified our approach with a specified model of a subset
of the Data Protection Act 2018 and The Network and Information
Systems Regulations 2018, in order to create a suitable legal knowl-
edge base. We then performed logical reasoning in Prolog in order to
find violations of prescriptive law, and predict legal consequences
that may arise from security problems with respect to Android
applications. In particular, we chose a calculator application, and
a custom-built application which exhibits some of the behaviours
we are interested in. We performed queries aimed at detecting the
violation of data confidentiality under the skeptical mindset, which,
in turn, we used to perform queries aimed at detecting violations
of the prescriptive law.
Our work has application in three possible scenarios. The first
one involves developers using MagnetDroid to avoid unnecessary
vulnerabilities in the applications they build. Here our system can
provide shallow explanations of the violations. The second one
involves users of applications leveraging MagnetDroid to become
aware of the vulnerabilities/maliciousness of the applications they
use, along with the legal consequences such violations may have. Fi-
nally, the third one involves legal professionals using MagnetDroid
to establish technology-based interpretation of facts in specific
incidents involving private data of Android users.
MagnetDroid is a proof of concept prototype that integrates a
number of complex technologies. Tools from the information secu-
rity community, distributed agent platforms with a specific agent
model and symbolic reasoning techniques based on computational
logic. However, in developing the prototype and its use we have
identified a number of areas for future work.
• ASO and its application on specific tools. Strictly speaking
the notion of ontology in ASO as presented in this work
is more like an information model because it lacks a for-
mal naming and definition of the categories, properties and
relations between the concepts, data and entities that sub-
stantiate it. However, we have kept the ontology term here,
as we envisage that future implementations of ASO (e.g. in
OWL) would make the acronym more accurate. In addition,
the translation of raw reports into instantiations of ASO is
not provably lossless, and it is currently limited to specific
versions of specific tools. As a next step we plan to develop
an ASO-compatible API for perspective Android application
analysis tools developers which would specify a format, the
syntax, and the semantics of an ASO-compatible report. Such
step would allow us to completely skip the translation of the
reports, and to immediately perform the aggregation of the
retrieved reports. An ASO-compatible API for tool writers
as a future work is inspired by existing similar technologies,
e.g., the X.509[13] standard which specifies the format of
certificates to be used for authentication of remote parties.
It does not matter who the subject the certificate refers to
is, or who the issuer is (as long as it is trusted): a software
receiving a certificate is able to immediately understand its
syntax and semantics without any translation needed.
• Inconsistencies from tools and interpretation of the law. Our
work in this paper was based on existing Android appli-
cation analysis tools as the source of the raw reports we
translated and aggregated. In doing so, we found that we
always inherited the corresponding accuracy, precision, and
recall from these tools. One aspect of our framework that
mitigated for such cases was the CONFLICTING mechanism.
As the conflicting information is likely the result of a mis-
take by one or more tools, discarding conflicting information
allowed us to “discard” the erroneous information, wherever
it was. Conflicts may also arise from the open-textured na-
ture of the law, which for the AI and law literature is not a
new problem (e.g. [9]). It has been suggested that this type
of problem is best dealt with using argumentation-based
techniques (e.g. [8]) and a whole area of work has been ini-
tiated in this direction as a result (e.g. [30, 42]). In addition,
multi-agent platforms that are argumentation-based exist
too (e.g. [39]), as well as agent models where argumenta-
tion drives an agent’s internal operation (e.g. [43]). Dialogue
games are often used in practice to implement these tech-
niques in interactive systems (e.g. [36, 37]).
• Overfitting to the law. Our model of the law is derived by
means of selecting a subset of a pair of Acts in a single juris-
diction, and performing a manual work of translation from
natural language to the tree representation. The creation of
the model can be refined in at least two ways: selecting a
broader range of rules and regulations, and using natural
language processing techniques in order to automate the
process of building the model tree.
Dealing with the all of the above issues has opened up important
areas that will be the focus of our work for the future.
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